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that the defendant's due process rights are protected, to assure that all
mitigating evidence is admitted to the jury, and to assure the reliability
of the sentencing determination of thejury. In all but the rarest case it is
imperative that counsel seek to have juries accurately informed of parole
law on all three Simmons grounds. For assistance in litigating the case
and avoiding default where the defendant is technically eligible for
parole, please contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse.




114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In October 1986, Paul Palalaua Tuilaepa and an accomplice
entered a Long Beach bar and, at gunpoint, demanded money from all
persons within. After one patron resisted, Tuilaepa opened fire and killed
the patron and seriously and permanently injured three others. The State
sought the death penalty against Tuilaepa, charging him with first degree
murder and one statutory special circumstance, murder during the
course of a robbery.
1
In April 1982, William Arnold Proctor entered the Shasta county
home of Bonnie Stendal where he tortured, raped and strangled the fifty-
five year-old schoolteacher. The state sought the deathpenalty, charging
Proctor with murder and several special circumstances, including
murder during the commission of a rape, murder during the commission
of a burglary, and infliction of torture during a murder.
2
A defendant in California becomes death eligible when a jury
finds guilt of first degree murder and at least one of the nineteen special
circumstances listed in the California Penal Code, section 190.2. The
case then proceeds to the sentencing phase where the jury must consider
numerous other factors set forth in section 190.3 in deciding whether to
impose death. Section 190.3 sets forth a list of open-ended subject
matters for the jury's perusal in its consideration of the individual
defendant and his unique circumstances.
Against the California statutory framework, both Tuilaepa and
Proctor were convicted of first degree murder and unanimously sen-
tenced to death. Both defendants appealed to the California Supreme
Court, which affirmed their convictions and death sentences. 3 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review petitioners'
contention that three of the section 190.3 selection factors are defined in
open-ended and therefore vague terms in contravention of the Constitu-
tion and, as a consequence, it was error to instruct their respective juries
to consider these factors.4 Both Tuilaepa and Proctor challenged factor
(a) which requires the sentencer to consider "[tihe circumstances of the
crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding




5 Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.3 (a) (1988) (emphasis added).
and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true ....- 5
Tuilaepa challenged two additional factors: factor (b) which requires
consideration of "[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the
defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence
or the express or implied threat to use force or violence,' 6 and factor (i)
which contemplates "[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime."7
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court found that the California 190.3
selection factors are not unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth
Amendment. In so holding, the Court announced that open-ended
selection factors such as 190.3 (a), (b) and (i) are not constitutionally
deficient if they are phrased in language comprehensible to the layman.
Open-ended selection factors facilitate individualized sentencing, thereby
reducing the risk of arbitrary and capricious punishment.
8
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In rejecting the vagueness claims of defendants, the majority spoke
at length of the capital decision making process mandated by the Eighth
Amendment. This process is designed to guard against the risk of
"wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 9 Essentially, the inquiry is
twofold. First the trier of fact must determine whether the defendant is
eligible to receive the death penalty. If the defendant is found eligible,
the trier must then decide whether or not to impose the death sentence.
Each step serves a different but constitutionally necessary purpose and
thus each requires a different analytical approach.
The threshold decision places metes and bounds on death eligibility
by fitting the crime within a legislatively defined category. A defendant
is cast into the ring of death eligible defendants if the sentencer convicts
6 Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.3 (b) (1988) (emphasis added).
7 Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.3 (i) (1988) (emphasis added).
8 Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2630.
9 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
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him of murder and finds the existence of at least one aggravating
circumstance. There are two requirements placed on this aggravator.
First, it must only apply to a subclass of defendants convicted of
murder t 0 and, second, it must not be defined in vague statutory lan-
guage. 1 1 The eligibility aggravators must therefore be both functional in
terms of narrowing the field and objectively clear so as to aid the trier of
fact in this constricting task. Aggravators meeting these requirements
reduce the risk of cruel and unusual punishment and pave the way for a
competent selection process.
According to the Court, once a state has adopted a methodology that
adequately confines eligibility, the distinctive procedural requirements
of the Eight Amendment are met.12 The next requirement is, in effect,
an additional safeguard against improper imposition of the death sen-
tence. The purpose of the selection decision is to determine who among
the death eligible should in fact be sentenced to death. This is accom-
plished by a complete assessment of the defendant's culpability. The
objective is an individualized sentencing based on the character of the
defendant and the circumstances of the crime.13 The selection process
must therefore be expansive enough to allow the jury to consider all
relevant mitigating evidence.14
Thus, the crux of eligibility is to actively identify those defendants
convicted of murder for whom death is not a disproportionate punish-
ment, while selection identifies those in the eligibility subclass who will
in fact receive the penalty. The focus of the former aspect is restrictive
in nature while the latter is a more searching inquiry in scope, taking into
account a myriad ofrelevantfactors. The majority acknowledges that the
objectives of these inquiries can be in tension, but that there is neverthe-
less a principle in common to both: the state's death penalty scheme, as
a whole, must be a neutral and principled process "so as to guard against
bias or caprice in the sentencing decision." 15 Accordingly, both eligibil-
ity and selection factors must not be vague.
The vagueness review of a challenged state sentencing factor,
eligibility or selection, relies on the basic principle that an aggravator is
not unconstitutionally infirm if it has a"common-sense core of meaning
... that criminal juries should be capable of understanding." 16 As the
Court noted in Walton v. Arizona,17 the proper degree of definition of
eligibility and selection factors is not susceptible to an exacting calcula-
tion and thus the court's vagueness review is quite deferential.
I. The Challenged California Factors
Defendants challenged the unrestricted scope of the California
190.3 selection factors. According to defendants, a capital jury may not
be instructed to simply consider the open-ended subject matters of 190.3
10 SeeArave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993), and case summary
of Arave, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 4 (1993).
t Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (stating that in order
for an aggravator to be valid and functional, its meaning must be
objectively clear to the sentencer).
12 Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2639.
13 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
14 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that death
penalty schemes must allow the defendant to present any mitigating
evidence to the capital sentencer).
15 Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2635.
16 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,279 (1976).
17 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
18 Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2638.
19 Id. at 2636.
20 Id.
(a), (b) and (i). Defendants contended that these selection factors must
meet the requirements for eligibility factors and therefore be limited and
directive in scope. 18
The majority found no merit to defendants' claims and, quite to the
contrary, approved the nonpropositional content of the challenged fac-
tors. As defined by the Court, a nonpropositional factor is one which
presents a subject matter to be considered by the jury in its sentencing
deliberations, while a propositional factor asks a specific question of the
jury and requires either an affirmative or negative response. 19 The Court
explained that it is a state's use of vague propositional factors in the
sentencing decision which creates the unacceptable risk of randomness
prohibited by the constitution. 20 This risk is lessened when a factor does
not require a yes or no answer to a specific question, but instead only
directs the jury to consider a given subject matter.2 1 The Court found that
the California selection factors instruct the jury to consider relevant
subject matters in clear and understandable terms.
As to factor (a), the Court found the defendants' challenge at odds
with settled principles, for it is well established in capital jurisprudence
that the sentencer should consider the circumstances of the crime. Factor
(b) requires a backward-looking inquiry into the defendant's prior
criminal activity. This rests in large part on a consideration of matters of
historical factand is also a traditionally permissible part ofthe sentencing
process. Factor (c) which requires consideration of the age of the
defendant at the time of the crime was deemed by the majority to be a
most basic and essential factual inquiry. In dissent, Justice Blackmun
characterized age as an equivocal aggravating factor routinely used by
the state as a basis for urging the imposition of the death sentence,
regardless of how young or old the defendant was at the time of the
murder. 22 In response to this critique the majority stated that both the
prosecution and defense have the opportunity to argue the significance
of age and that "competing arguments by adversary parties bring per-
spective ... and thus serve to promote a more reasoned decision, provid-
ing guidance as to a factor jurors most likely would discuss in any
event."23
The Court's approval of the nonpropositional California selection
factors suggests that the risk of unacceptable randomness in sentencing
is adequately curtailed by the scrutiny of the nineteen special circum-
stances.24 As long as the eligibility factors perform all of the requisite
narrowing and guidance, the selection factors may be broad in scope so
as to allow the jury to consider the entire picture.25 Wide jury discretion
at the selection phase is not only allowed but in fact should be encour-
aged.26 The selection phase is fertile ground for the adversarial process.
The adversarial process should dominate this individualized aspect of the
sentencing decision and can only do so if the jury can consider a range
21 Id.
22 Id. at 2643-44.
23 Id. at 2637-38.
24 Id. at 2646 (according to Justice Blackmun, the nineteen eligi-
bility factors make for an extraordinarily large death pool).
25 Without elaborating, the Court proposed a distinction between
propositional and nonpropositional factors, suggesting that eligibility
factors should be propositional in nature and selection factors can, and
preferably should be, nonpropositional. The Court seemed to be saying
that the form of the factor is critical in satisfying the constitutional
functions of identifying the death eligible and individualizing the sen-
tencing decision. The Court appeared to be drawing a line between a
narrowing purpose and propositional content, on the one hand, and a
broader inquiry and nonpropostional content on the other.
26 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983) (emphasis in
original) ("In ensuring that the death penalty is not meted out arbitrarily
Page 10 - Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1
of relevant circumstances. 27 Thus, by explicitly instructing juries to
consider the relevant 190.3 factors in its deliberations, the California
scheme goes beyond the mandated Eighth Amendment narrowing. This
aspect of the scheme is tantamount to a statutory requirement of
weighing aggravation evidence against any mitigation set forth by the
defense and facilitates an informed and individualized determination.
28
In Espinosa v. Florida29 the Court held that states must actively
ensure aggravators meaningfully narrow the class of death eligible. The
Court also pronounced that something further is required of the eligibil-
ity criterion. Beyond a limiting function, the eligibility process must
also justify the imposition of death over life imprisonment on a defen-
dant convicted of murder. Tuilaepa suggests that these two require-
ments are the function of eligibility, not selection factors. This in turn
implicates the constitutionality of the Virginia vileness factor.
II. The Virginia Capital Sentencing Scheme
The decision of the United States Supreme Court upholding the
constitutionality of the open-ended Californiaselection factors rested on
the assumption that the nineteen special circumstances properly estab-
lish a threshold below which the death penalty cannot be imposed.
30
This has strong implications for the Virginia capital sentencing scheme.
If tested under this scheme, the Virginia vileness factor would undoubt-
edly fail. Not only is this factor vague on its face and its narrowing
construction inf'mn, 31 it is an eligibility requirement.
Under Virginia law the death penalty may be imposed for capital
murder only if at least one of two statutory aggravating circumstances
is found to exist.32 Thus, for a defendant to become death eligible the
underlying statutory crime and future dangerousness or vileness must
be found beyond a reasonable doubt.33 Vileness is a threshold eligibility
requirement in the Virginia capital sentencing scheme, yet it altogether
fails to genuinely direct and limit the sentencer's judgment as Tuilaepa
mandates.
or capriciously, the Court's principal concern has been more with the
procedure by which the State imposes the death sentence than with the
substantive factors the State lays before the jury as a basis for imposing
death, once it has been determined that the defendant falls within the
category of persons eligible for the death penalty.").
27 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976)
(approving "the wide scope of evidence and -argument allowed at
presentence hearings").
28 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (capital
defendant is entitled to individualized determination of culpability).
29 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992).
30 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305 (1987).
31 In Virginia, vileness is defined as conduct "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.4(c) (1990). In Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433, the United States Supreme
Court held identical language to be unconstitutionally vague without a
constitutionally sufficient narrowing construction to permit the sentencer
to distinguish meaningfully among murderers the few for whom the
death penalty is appropriate. For discussion of the Virginia narrowing
construction, see infra note 33.
32 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(c) (1990). See also Smith v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,248 S.E.2d 135 (1978) (court obliquely
but definitely held that even if both Virginia aggravating circumstances
Although the Virginia statutory scheme does not contain any
legislatively designated selection factors like those at issue in Tuilaepa,
the state's eligibility factor is nevertheless implicated for its definitional
vagueness and propositional content. Tuilaepa reaffirms that, as an
eligibility factor, vileness cannot be simply pejorative and must have a
commonsense meaning. Under Tuilaepa, even the "narrowing" con-
structions of the vileness factor devised in Smith v. Commonwealth are
insufficient.34 This is true in spite of the recent opinion of a panel of the
Fourth Circuit approving the constructions.35 Moreover, as a proposi-
tional factor, an elevated level of scrutiny is required to ensure that
meaningful narrowing and effective guidance are provided to the jury.
Yet, a commonsense reading of the factor, even together with its
"narrowing" construction, reveals that it completely fails to narrow the
death eligible pool and justify imposition of a more severe sentence.
36
Application of the vileness factor has yet to come under review by the
United States Supreme Court nor has the Virginia statute itself been
specifically approved.
II. Tuilaepa's Message for Virginia Practitioners
Tuilaepa provides yet another reminder of the importance of
properly litigating andpresenting objections to the application of Virginia's
vileness factor. The holding of Tuilaepa that California's selection
factors passed constitutional muster does not directly implicate Virginia
law. However, the comments of the majority concerning the constitu-
tional requirements of factors that determine death eligibility strongly
indicate that if the Virginia capital sentencing scheme everreceives a full
and fair review by the federal judiciary, it will be found wanting.
The Bill of Particulars is the starting point for both a Fourteenth
Amendment "notice and opportunity to defend" claim37 and an Eighth
are found to be true, the jury is nevertheless free to impose a life
sentence).
33 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(c) (1990).
34 In Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,478,248 S.E.2d 135,
149 (1978), the court defined "depravity of mind" as "a degree of moral
turpitude and psychic debasement surpassing that inherent in the defini-
tion of legal malice and premeditation". It defined "aggravated battery"
as "a battery which is qualitatively and quantitatively more culpable than
the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder." Subsequently
in Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784 (1979), the
court held that these definitions were not exclusive.
35 See Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994) (petition for
rehearing en banc pending). In any event, the panel opinion rests upon
a misreading of Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993), and appears to
be plainly at odds with the requirements for eligibility factors set out in
Tuilaepa. See case summary of Arave, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6,
No. 1, p. 4 (1993).
36 See Arave, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993) (stating that by application,
the aggravating factor must apply only to a subclass of defendants).
37 In order for a capital defendant to have constitutionally sufficient
notice and opportunity to defend himself, it is critical that the Common-
wealth supply the defendant with both the aggravating factor and the
narrowing construction upon which the death penalty will be sought.
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Amendment "vagueness" claim38 against the vileness factor. As applied
in the Virginia capital scheme, the constitutionality of the vileness factor
is one of the last and most promising issues not yet expressly ruled upon
Accordingly, a defendant is denied due process when the Common-
wealth fails to produce a narrowing construction for the vileness factor
which is both comprehensible to the jury and specific enough so that the
defense may proceed with preparation of its case. See, e.g., Clark, 201
Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784 (1979) (capital defendant in Virginia can not
rely on vileness as having one specific meaning and seek to defend
himself on those grounds).
38 In addition to the clarity required in order to give defendant an
opportunity to defend against an eligibility factor, the jury is entitled to
by the United States Supreme Court. Contact the Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse for assistance in litigating these issues.
Summary and analysis by:
Jody M. Bieber
be instructed in language that has a commonsense core of meaning. Not
all purportedly narrowing constructions have been found sufficient to
meet this requirement. See, e.g., Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990)
(The limiting construction of the Mississippi "vileness" factor was
unconstitutionally vague. The construction could be construed by
sensible jurors to characterize nearly all murders. Therefore, discrimina-
tive and individualized imposition of the death penalty was not attainable
by applying the indiscriminate limiting construction.).
McFARLAND v. SCOTT
114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
The State of Texas convicted Frank Basil McFarland of capital
murder and sentenced him to death on November 13, 1989. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmedl and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 2 Subsequently, the trial court set McFarland's
execution for September 23, 1993.
McFarland, desiring to initiate a state habeas corpus proceeding,
moved the trial court to stay or withdraw his execution date so that the
Texas Resource Center would have time to find counsel for the proceed-
ing. Texas contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction to stay the
execution since McFarland had not filed an application for a writ of
habeas corpus. Though declining to appoint counsel for McFarland, the
trial court moved the execution date to October 27, 1993.
3
The Texas Resource Center could not obtain counsel forMcFarland
and on October 16, 1993 asked the court to appoint counsel. The trial
court declined to do so and further refused to modify the execution date,
deciding that McFarland was not entitled to appointment of counsel for
state habeas corpus proceedings in Texas.4 The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals subsequently denied McFarland's pro se motion requesting a
stay and remand for appointment of counsel.
5
1 McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
2 McFarland v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2937 (1993).
3 McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568, 2570 (1994).
4 McFarland, 114 S. Ct. at 2570.
5 Id.
6 McFarland relied on 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B)(q) (1988):
In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255
of title 28 seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any
defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain
adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other rea-
On October 22, 1993, McFarland filed a pro se motion to obtain
federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas. He also requested appointment of counsel
6
and a stay of execution to allow time for that attorney to file a federal
habeas corpus petition. The District Court denied the motion on October
25, 1993. 7 Concluding that McFarland's claim had not triggered a"post
conviction proceeding" under the federal habeas corpus statute, 8 that
court decided that McFarland was therefore not entitled to appointment
of counsel and that the District Court had no jurisdiction to enter a stay.
The District Court also denied a certificate of probable cause to appeal. 9
Meanwhile, a federal magistrate judge had found an attorney for
McFarland. The magistrate judge suggested the attorney file a cursory
petition for writ of habeas corpus so that the District Court might appoint
the attorney and grant McFarland a stay. The attorney did so, but the
District Courtheld the petition insufficient and also denied the motion for
stay.10
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also denied McFarland's appli-
cation for a stay on October 26, 1993, the day before his scheduled
execution. 11 That court decided that although federal courts could stay
sonably necessary services shall be entitled to the appointment
of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other
services in accordance with paragraphs (5), (6), (7), (8), and
(9).
7 McFarland, 114 S. Ct. at 2571.
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255 (1988).
9 McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. at 2571.
10 McFarland v. Collins, 7 F.3d 47 (5th Cir. 1993).
11 Id.
